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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

HOWARD W. BRANDT and LEONA
J. BRANDT, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 9128
SPRINGVILLE BANKING COMPANY
a Utah corporation, F. C.
PACKARD and HOWARD C.
MAYCOCK,
Defendants and Respondents,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
The only factual evidence requested by and submitted
to the lower court are the alleged facts set forth in De-
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fendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R 27), Defendants' Affidavit in support thereof ( R 29), Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint ( R 21) and Plaintiff's Affidavit Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R 36).
The court did not take any testimony of witnesses as to
any factual matter.
Plaintiffs and their family have been patrons and
depositors of the Springville Banking Company from ap·
proximately 1949 to approximately 1958; that during said
time plaintiffs were personal friends of said defendants
F. C. Packard and Howard C. Maycock, President and
Cashier respectively of said Springville Banking Company;
that many times during said period plaintiffs have consulted with said officers of said bank on financial matters
pertaining to their personal affairs; that during said time
defendant Maycock was the religious teacher and advisor
of plaintiffs. ( R 42) .
Plaintiffs were contacted by said Waldo Jackson and
said officers of the Springville Banking Company to put
new money into the Jackson Sales & Service Company; that
plaintiffs did not want to become involved in Jackson Sales
& Service business but were interested in organizing a farm
implement corporation with said Waldo Jackson apart from
Jackson Sales & Service. Later on Waldo Jackson and the
above named defendants proposed that a new corporation
be organized under the name of Stockman & Farmers Mart
for the purpose of conducting the farm machinery business
in which plaintiffs were to invest ·$10,000.00; Waldo Jackson
was to invest in the new corporation by transferring to it, free
of encumbrance, certain of the assets of the Jackson Sales
& Service Co. The new corporation was organized by Glen
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W. Sumsion, the regular attorney for said defendant bank
at the request of and recommendation of Waldo Jackson
and said defendants.
That for plaintiffs to go through with their end of the
deal it was necessary to borrow $10,000.00; that the above
named defendants suggested that plaintiffs assign their
equity in their home in Springville, Utah, to an aunt in California to secure a $S,OOO.OO loan from her, and that plaintiff
Howard M. Brandt take out a $5,000.00 policy of insurance
on his life with his aunt as beneficiary; that the Santa
Monica Branch of the Bank of America made an inquiry at
the request of plaintiff's aunt of the Springville Banking
Company as to the financial status of plaintiffs and one
Waldo Jackson; that the Springville Banking Company
through its president, D·efendant F. C. Packard, answered
said inquiry recommending the loan and the financial integrity of plaintiffs and said Waldo Jackson. ( R 37, 50).
Thereafter plaintiffs were successful in procuring the
$5,000.00 loan from said aunt, which sum was deposited to
the personal account of plaintiff Howard W. Brandt in the
said Springville Banking Company. That said bank then
loaned the plaintiffs an additional $5,000.00 upon their
personal note and accepted as security for the payment of
same the proceeds from a Salina real estate GOntract which
was escrowed with the bank. This $5,000.00. was also
deposited in the personal account of plaintiff Howard W.
Brandt in the said Springville Banking Company ..
Up to this point, neither Waldo Jackson, the Spring~
ville Banking Company, nor its officers F. C. Packard and
Howard C. Maycock, had _disclosed to plaintiffs in any way
what was to be done with the $10,000.00 plaintiffs ha-d hor-
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rowed for investment in the Stockman & Farmers Mart. That
on or about March 2, 1955, ·plaintiffs met at the Springville
Banking Company with the said Waldo Jackson and said
defendant, Howard C. Maycock, cashier of the Springville
Banking Company, for the purpose of completing the transaction with the Stockman & Farmers Mart. That at said time
plaintiffs did not know that the Jackson Sales & Service Co.
was indebted to the Springville Banking Company in the sum
of .$45,000.00 or any other sum; that at said time plaintiffs
did not know that the $10,000.00 they were putting into the
Stockman & Farmers Mart was to be paid out to Jackson
Sales & Service Co. and that said Jackson Sales & Service Co.
was to immediately pay out said sum to s4id bank in partial
satisfaction of its obligation to the Springville Banking Company; that neither Waldo Jackson nor any of the officers of
said bank, each of whom well knew that Jackson Sales &
Service Co. was so indebted, made any disclosure to plaintiffs of these facts. That at said meeting, defendant Howard
C. Maycock directed that plaintiff Howard W. Brandt make
his personal check of $10,000.00 to the Stockman & Farmers
Mart in payment of stock he was to receive in said corpora·
tion; that said $10,000.00 was to be applied by Stockman
& Farmers Mart on the purchase price of the inventory of the
Jackson Sales & Service Co. which had been taken and
evaluated at $26,500.00. That subsequently, on or about
June, 1958, affiant learned that said $10,000.00 was
paid on the said 2nd day of March, 1955, to the defendant,
Springville Banking Company, on an indebtedness owing by
Jackson Sales & Service to the bank which was in the ap·
proximate amount of .$41,194.79 and which was secured by
a chattel mortgage in the sum of $45,000.00 on the personal
property of the said Jackson Sales & Service Co., including
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the inventory which was to be transferred to the Stockman &
Farmers Mart by the said Jackson Sales & Service Co. Said
chattel mortgage is the same chattel mortgage referred to in
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on file in said
case. ( R. 39) Said chattel mortgage was filed of record
with the County Recorder of Utah County on September 24,
1949, as Entry #8708.
That at said time, to-wit, March 2, 1955, Defendant
Springville Banking Co. held said chattel mortgage given
by Jackson Sales & Service to Defendant Springville Banking
Co. for $45,000.00 on said inventory, fixtures and equipment; that the unpaid balance on said chattel mortgage on
March 2, 1955, was approximately $41,194.79; that plaintiffs at said time did not know of the existence of said chattel mortgage, and they would not have entered into said new
business of Stockman & Farmers Mart, nor invested
$10,000.00 or any sum in said company if they had known
of the existence of said chattel mortgage at said time; that
plaintiffs did not discover or learn of the existence of said
chattel mortgage until on or about June, 1958. ( R. 40)
That said defendants, by reason of the relationship
which existed between them and the plaintiffs, and by reason
of plaintiff's placing confidence in them, and by reason of
defendants' having superior knowledge of the facts, had a
duty to speak and disclose to plaintiffs the existence of said
chattel mortgage and the obligation it secured on the 2nd
day of March, 1955, and subsequent thereto; that defendants
remained silent and thereby deceitfully and· fraudulently
concealed from plaintiffs the material fact of the existence
of said chattel mortgage and the obligation of ·$41,194. 79
until plaintiffs learned about the existence of said mortgage
on or about June, 1958.
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Also at the conference at the bank above mentioned,
Defendant Maycock credited the bank account of Stockman
& Farmers Mart with $6,500.00, taking its promissory note
for the same and specifically directing that this money be
used to pay the debts of Jackson Sales & Service Co. and for
no other purpose, which was done.
Furthermore, in May 1955, Defendant Packard of the
bank put the pressure on Waldo Jackson and plaintiffs to
sell the inventory and assets of the Stockman & Farmers Mart
in order that the bank's $6,500.00 obligation could be
liquidated. In September, 1955, at the instance and demand
of Defendants, Stockman & Farmers Mart did exchange its
assets for a farm at Payson, Utah, owned by one E. A.
Smithurst subject to a mortgage in the sum of approximately
$6,7 51.23 ; the defendant bank presided throughout this
Smithurst transaction; a short time later said farm was sold
to John T. Martin and the net proceeds thereof in the sum
of $4,300.00 was paid to said defendant bank upon said
$6,500.00 loan.
That said defendants and one Waldo Jackson concealed
the plan which the above facts disclose to induce plaintiffs
to borrow the ·$10,000.00 to invest in farm equipment sales
business, but said defendants fraudulently concealed from
plaintiffs the fact that said money was in reality to be used
for the purpose of liquidating the obligation of the Jackson
Sales & Service Co. to the Springville Banking Company;
that the Springville Banking Company knew of and participated in the plan to induce plaintiffs to borrow and invest
the $10,000.00 as aforesaid and conspired with the said
Waldo Jackson to conceal from plaintiffs the fact that Jackson Sales & Service Co. owed said money to the bank; that
the concealment of said material facts in connection with said
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business transaction is actionable where there is a duty to
speak; this duty to speak arises because of the confidential
relationship existing between plaintiffs and defendants,
which gives rise to an obligation to reveal all the facts in
connection with the transaction and particularly the existence
of the Springville Banking Company's chattel mortgage of
$45,000.00, on which there was owing $41,194.79, covering
the assets of Jackson Sales & Service Co., which assets were
transferred by the Jackson Sales & Service Co. to Stockman & Farmers Mart; that the inventory of the assets and
personal property so transferred as aforesaid had a reasonable cash value of only $26,500.00; that if there had been
a full disclosure to plaintiffs of the facts hereinabove set
forth they would not have invested the sum of $10,000.00
or any other sum into this enterprise and incurred the
financial obligations incident to this bankrupt concern.
Defendant Howard C. Maycock, cashier of said bank,
falsely represented to plaintiffs that the ·$10,000 supplied
by plaintiffs would be put into the business of the Stockman
& Farmers Mart and another $:10,000 would be put into said
business by Waldo Jackson; that the additional capital
would make it a better business. That said defendant falsely
represented that the obligations of the new corporation would
be approximately $6,500 and the Stockman & Farmers Mart
would pay this obligation.

Deposition of Howard C. Maycock: (R. 42-43)

"Q. Are you acquainted with Mr. Howard W.
Brandt?
"A. I am.
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"Q. When did you first become acquainted with
him?
"A. At the time he purchased his home in
Springville.

"Q. Do you know when that was?
"A. I would be guessing, but some time around
1949, I think.

"Q. Then for at least approximately 10 years or
9 years you have been acquainted with Mr. Brandt?
"A. That is right.

"Q. What has been the nature of your acquaintance with him?
"A. The fact that he has been a customer of the
bank, a depositor having a checking account there and
also in connection with church affairs. I happen to
be his ward teacher."

* * *

"Q. Were you acquainted with the business of
Jackson Sales & Service as run by Mr. Waldo Jackson?

"A. As he made deposits, yes.
"Q. Didn't you talk to him about how business
at that time was going and what obligations he had at
this time?
"A. Yes.

"Q. Preceding the March 2nd date?
"A. We felt an additional $10,000 in the business would make it a better business and it would
also give a new personality to it. We felt Brandt
could add something to the business to make it better. He came in as an active participant in the business, he was not just an investor.
"Q. He was going to work in the business?
"A. And he did work.
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"Q. He quit another job to work in the business?
"A. That is right.

I guess he had another job.

"Q. At that time, at the time that you were
discussing this business with him (Brandt) and Mr.
Waldo Jackson, the nature of this business, was anything said about how much ownership each would
have in the Stockman and Farmers Mart?
"A. Each was supposed to have a half interest,
$10,000 apiece.

"Q. So, the $10,000 that Mr. Brandt put up by
means of a check that I referred to here before, dated
March 2nd, was what he put in that day?
"A. Yes.

"Q. And the deposit that you referred to her
for the ·$650.00 plus the $9,350.00 is what Mr. Jackson put in the business?
"A. Yes.
"Q. At that time they were going over the inventory and this merchandise, did they discuss with
you the amount of the obligations? You said something-it was being taken subject to the obligations?
"A. My r.ecollection is that it was approximately
$6,500 and Stockman & Farmers Mart would pay
that obligation.

"Q. To whatever creditors there were of Jackson
Sales & Service, is that correct?
"Yes, that is correct."

* * *

(R. 44)
"Q. On the date of March 2, 1955, did you advise Mr. Howard W. Brandt that the bank had a
chattel mortgage on the equipment as shown upon the
chattel mortgage and the balance was some $40,000.00?
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"A. I don't recall.

"Q. When you say you don't recall, do you
recall the conversation?
"A. I don't know what I told him."

* * *
"Q. Do you have any reason that you know of
not telling Mr. Brandt about the bank's loan to Mr.
Jackson or Jackson Sales & Service for this $40 .

0 00.00.?
"A. I said I didn't tell him.
remember.

'

I said I could not

"Q. You don't think you mentioned it to him?
"A. N0.

"Q. Do you know of any reason?
"A. No, I felt this was a separate corporation
and had nothing to do with the other one, after the
transfer of the physical assets."
Waldo Jackson in his deposition testified that he did
not nor did Jackson Sales & Service Co. invest any money in
the Stockman & Farmers Mart; that the two checks of $650.00
and $9,350.00 respectively, as testified to by Defendant
Maycock, as above set forth, did not represent any cash con·
tribution to the Stockman & Farmers Mart but were simply
used as a matter of bookkeeping. The following testimony is
taken from the deposition of Waldo I ackson ( R. 4 7-48) :

"Q. Had you borrowed any money from the
bank on Jackson Sales & Service?
"A. Yes, I borrowed money from the banl{.

"Q. Under the date of March 2, 1955, do you
know how much you owed the bank?
"A. $40,100.00 and some odd dollars.
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"Q. Is that from your own recollection?
"A. That is the note I paid off finally and that
was the balance that was owing at the time the deal
was set up with Mr. Brandt.

"Q. Did you ever advise Mr. Brandt that this
amount was due and owing to the bank?
"A. No, because I didn't think it concerned
him.'' (pages 6-7)

* * *

"Q. How much money did you invest in Stockman & Farmers Mart, you personally?
"A. I didn't invest any, none.

"Q. Did Jackson Sales & Service put anything
into it?
"A. How much did they put in?
"Mr. Howard: Are you talking about money?
"Mr. Conder Yes.
"A. Money? None, then. .
"Q. You heard the desposition of Mr. Maycock referring to two checks shown and deposits
for Jackson Sales & Service; one for $650.00 and one
for $9,350.00?
"A. Yes.

"Q. Did you prepare such checks?
"A. Yes, I prepared the checks.

"Q. You say there was no money invested by
Jackson Sales & Service?
"A. No.

"Q. Where did the money come from on these
checks?
"A. It was to satisfy the inventory transfer,
the inventory in Stockman & Farmers Mart, it was
just a fixture or instrument in your language, a fixture in mine."
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*

* *
"Q. Do you recall borrowing $6,500.00 from

the bank?
"A. Yes, I recall that.

"Q. And signing a note?
"A. I didn't sign a note.

"Q. I show you the note here for $6,500.00
which is signed by Mr. Brandt; did you authorize that
loan for Stockman & Farmers Mart?
"A. Yes.

"Q. And had you signed anything In connection with this note with the bank?
"A. Not that I recall." {page 15)
Referring to said chattel mortgage, the President of the
Defendant Bank testified in his deposition that said chattel
mortgage covered all of the inventory and merchandise of
Jackson Sales & Service; that said mortgage was not paid
by 1955. (R 46)
Waldo Jackson in his deposition testified he did not
disclose to plaintiffs the amount due and owing defendant
bank on said chattel mortgage in the sum of $40,100.00 and
some odd dollars at the time the deal was set up with Mr.
Brandt. (R 47)
The lower court in his Memorandum Decision stated:
(R 54)
"The plaintiffs' case appears to be based on the
making of, and losing an investment of $10,000 in a
corporation known as the Stockman & Farmers Mart
in reliance on the representation that the personal
property transferred to the corporation was free from
liens and encumbrances when in fact there was a
chattel mortgage on such property, securing a note
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to the defendant bank with an unpaid balance of
$41,194.79. All particulars were known to the defendants, none of whom disclosed the indebtedness or
lien to plaintiffs at the time the plaintiffs discussed
with defendants the making of, and arranged and
made, the aforesaid investment. The corporation
later failed and plaintiffs' investment. was lost."
STATEMENT OF POINTS

I.
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS SET FORTH
IN SECTION 78-12-26, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
AND AS A MATTER OF LAW PLAINTIFFS DID NOT
HAVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF
THE EXISTENCE OF SAID CHATTEL MORTGAGE
MORE THAN THREE YEARS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF SAID ACTION.

II.
THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT IN THE SUPPRESSION OF TRUTH, AS WELL AS BY POSITIVE STATEMENTS OF FALSEHOOD, WAS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR IN CAUSING PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGE IN THE SUM
OF $10,000.00, AND THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN SAID CASE.
ARGUMENT
As to Point I, plaintiffs' cause of action is not barred
by the statute of limitations as set forth in Section 78-12-26,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.. Section 78-12-26, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provides a three-year limitation on actions
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set forth in said section.
lows:

Subparagraph ( 3) reads as fol-

" ( 3) An action for relief on the ground of
fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such case
shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting
the fraud or mistake."
In the case of SMITH VS. EDWARDS (1932)
81 Utah 244, 17 P 2d 265, the court held:
"Under the laws of Utah it is clear that the
limitation does not begin to run until the facts constituting the fraud are discovered. There is therefore
a great deal said in these cases about what amounts
to discovery. *** The question is, what constitutes
a 'discovery' within the meaning of the statute?
Mere constructive notice of the deed by reason of its
being filed for record is not notice of the facts constituting the fraud. ***
To ascertain what constitutes 'a discovery of
the facts constituting the fraud,' reference must be
had to the principles of equity. ***Hence, in actions
in equity, the rule was that the means of know ledge
were equivalent to actual knowledge; that is, that a
knowledge of fact which would have put an ordinarily
prudent man upon inquiry which, if followed up,
would have resulted in a discovery of the fraud, was
equivalent to actual discovery."
The Memorandum Decision of the lower court in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment placed no
credence in defendants' contention that plaintiffs' cause of
action was barred by the statute of limitations. The allegation in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint that they did not discover or learn of the existence of said chattel mortgage until
on or about June, 1958 ( R 22-23) is controlling in absence
of any evidence to the contrary.
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POINT II. THE DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT IN THE
SUPPRESSION OF TRUTH, AS WELL AS BY POSITIVE
STATEMENTS OF FALSEHOOD, WAS A SUBSTANTIAL
FACTOR IN CAUSING PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGE IN THE
SUM OF $10,000.00, AND THE COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN SAID CAUSE.
The following excerpts from the Law of Torts by William L. Prosser, 2nd Edition ( 1955) are pertinent in explanation of the legal questions set forth in plaintiffs' Point II:

"CAUSATION IN F:A:CT: (p. 218-223)
"The defendant is not liable for the plaintiff's
injury unless he has in fact caused it. Causation is a
matter of what has in fact occurred. The fact of causation is essential to liability, but does not alone determine it, since other considerations may prevent it
although causation is established.
"If the defendant's act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the result, it will be
regarded as a cause in fact. Ordinarily it will be
such a substantial factor if the 11esult would not have
occurred without it.
"The plaintiff is not required to establish the
fact of causation with absolute certainty. It is sufficient that he introduces evidence from which reasonable men may conclude that it is more probabLe that
the defendant's conduct was a cause than it was not.
"An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of
action for negligence, or for that matter for any other
tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the
damage which the plaintiff has suffered. This connection usually is dealt with by the courts in terms of
what is called "proximate cause," or "legal cause."
There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law
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which has called forth more disagreement, or upon
which-the opinions are in such a welter of confusion.
N:or, despite_.the manifold attempts .which have been
mad~ Jo clarify the subject, is there. yet any general
agreement as to the .proper approach. - Much of this
confusion is due to the fact that no one problem is
involved, .but a number of different. problems, which
· are· not distinguished clearly, and that language appropriate to a discussion of one is carried over to
.east a shadow upon the others.
"Proximate cause"-in itself an unforunate
term-is merely the limitation which the courts have
placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequence of his conduct. * * *
"This limitation is sometimes, but rarely, one of
the fact of causation. More often it is purely one of
policy, not connected with questions of causation at
all. If the defendant excavates a hole by the side of
the road, and the plaintiff's runaway horse runs into
it, it scarcely can be pretended that the hole was not
a cause of the harm, and a very important one. If
the defendant escapes responsibility, it is because the
policy of the law does not require him to safeguard
the plaintiff against such a risk. On the same basis,
if the defendant drives through the state of New Jersey at an excessive speed, and arrives in Philadelphia
in time to be struck by lightning, his speed is a not unimportant cause of the accident, since without it he
would not have been there in time; and if he is not
. liable to his passenger, it is because in the eyes of the
law his negligence did.· not extend to such a risk. The
attempt to deal with such cases in the language of
causation. can lead only to confusion.
"The simplest and most obvious problem connected with "proximate cause" is that of causation.
Of all the questions involved, it is easiest to give an
answer to that· which traditionally is regarded as most
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difficult: has the conduct of the defendant caused
the plaintiff's loss? This is a question of fact, and
one on which any layman is quite as competent to sit
in judgment as the most experienced court.· In the ordinary case, it is peculiarly for the jury.
"Causation is a fact. ltJ is a matter of what has
in fact occurred. A cause is a necessary antecedent:
In a very practical sense the term embraces all things
which have so far contributed to the result that without them it would not have occurred. It covers not
only positive acts and active physical forces, but also
pre-existing passive conditions which have played a
material part in bringing about the event. In particular, it covers the defendant's omissions as well as
his acts. The failure to extingish a fire may be quite
as important in causing the destruction of a building
as setting it in the first place. The failure to fence a
railway track may be a cause, and an important one,
that a child is struck by a train. It is familiar law
that if such omissions are culpable they will result in
liability.

***"* * * A stabs C with a knife, and B fractures
C' s skull with a rock; either would be fatal, and C
dies from the effects of both. The defendant sets a
fire, which merges with a fire from some other source;
the combined fires burn the plaintiff's property, but
either one would have done it alone. In such cases it
is clear that each cause has played a part in the
result, and it is also clear that neither can be absolved from responsibility upon the ground that the
harm would have occurred without it, or there would
be no liability at all.
"It was in a case of this type that the Minnesota
Court applied a broader rule, which has found general acceptance: The defendant's conduct is a cause
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of the event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about. Whether it was
such a substantial factor is for the jury to determine,
unless the issue is so clear that reasonable men could
not differ. "Substantial factor" is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to the layman to furnish an adequate guide in instructions to the jury, and it is neither
possible nor desirable to reduce it to lower terms. As
applied to the fact of causation alone, no better test
has been devised.
"If the defendant's conduct was a substanlial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it follows that
he will not be absolved from responsibility merely
because other causes have contributed to the result.
Nothing occurs in a vacuum, and the event withoul
m.ultiple causes, numbered in the thousands, is inconceivable. In particular, the defendant is not necessarily relieved of liability because the negligence of
another person is also a contributing cause. Thus
where two vehicles collide and injure a bystander, or
a passenger in one of them, each driver may be liable
for the harm inflicted. The law of joint tortfeasors
rests largely upon recognition of the fact that each
of two causes may be charged with a single result.

***

"PROOF:
"On the issue of the fact of causation, as on
other issues essential to his case, the plaintiff has the
burden of proof. He must introduce evidence which
affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it
is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in the result.
"The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove
his case beyond a reasonable doubt. He need not
negative entirely the possibility that the defendant's
conduct was not a cause, and it is enough that he in-

***
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traduces evidence from which reasonable men may
conclude that it is more probable that the event was
caused by the defendant than that it was not. The fact
of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since
no man can say with absolute certainty what would
have occurred if the defendant had acted otherwise.
Proof of what we call the relation of cause and effect, that of necessary antecedent and inevitable consequence, can be nothing more than the "projection
of our habit of expecting certain consequents to follow
oertain antecedents merely because we had observed
these sequences on previous occasions." If as a matter
of ordinary experience a particular act or omission
might be expected, under the circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result in fact has
followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the
causal relation exists.
"Circumstantial evidence or common knowledge
may provide a basis from which the causal sequence
may be inferred. Thus it is every day experience
that unlighted stairs create a danger that someone will
fall. Such a condition "greatly multiplies the chances
of accident, and is of a character naturally leading to
its occurrence .. " When a fat woman tumbles down the
steps, it is a reasonable conclusion that it is more likely than not that the bad lighting has played a substantial part in the fall. When a child is drowned in a
swimming pool, no one can say with certainty that a
lifeguard would have saved him but the experience
of the community permits the conclusion that the absence of the guard played a significant part in the
drowning. SUCH QUESTIONS ARE PECULIARLY FOR THE JURY; AND WHETHER PROPER
CONSTRUCTION OF A BUILD~ING WOULD HAVE
WITHSTOOD AN EARTHQUAKE, OR WHETHER
REASONABLIE POLICE PRECAUTIONS WOULD
HAVE PREVENTED A BOY FROM SHOOTING
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THE PLAINTIFF IN THE EYE WITH AN AIRGUN., ARE QUESTIONS ON WHICH A COURT
CAN; SELDOM RULE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
(Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed. p. 532-536) :
"Representation and Nondisclosure:
"The representation which serves as the foundation for an action of deceit may consist of words or
conduct. Any active concealment of the truth, by
words or conduct creating a false impression or removing an opportunity to discover the facts, is treated
as the equivalent of a representation that such facts
are not true.

"It is commonly stated as a general rule that
deceit will not lie for mere silence, or passive nondisclosure. To this rule a number of poorly defined
exceptions have been developed, particularly where
the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary
relation, or the contract is one which is regarded as
requiring the utmost good faith. There is a tendency
on the part of some courts to require disclosure in
-any case where the defendant has special information
not available to the plaintiff, and fair conduct demands it.
"Equitable relief, or estoppel, also usually is
held to be available for nondisclosure of basic facts.
"The representation which will serve as a basis
for an action of deceit, as well as other forms of relief, usually consists, of course, of oral or written
words; but it is not necessarily so limited, and the
exhibition of a document, turning back the speedometer of an automobile offered for sale, drawing a
check without funds, or a wide variety of other conduct calculated to convey a misleading impression
under the circumstances of the case, may be suffici-
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ent. Here, as elsewhere, "actions may speak louder
than words."
"The significance to be assigned to such words
or conduct will be determined according to the effect
they would produce, under the circumstances, upon
the ordinary mind. * * *
"In addition to such representations by word
or conduct, which might be called definite or positive, deceit, as well as other remedies, may be based
upon an active concealment of the truth. Any words
or acts which create a false impression covering up
the truth, or which remove an opportunity that might
otherwise have led to the discovery of a material fact
-as by floating a ship to conceal the 'defects in her
bottom, sending one who is in search of information
in a direction where it cannot be obtained, or even a
false denial of know ledge by one in possession of the
facts--are classed as misrepresentation, no less than
a verbal assurance that the fact is not true.

"Nondisclosure:
"A much more difficult problem arise~ as to
whether mere silence, or a passive failure to disclose
facts of which the defendant has knowledge, can
serve as the foundation of a deceit action. It has
commonly been stated as a general rule, particularly
in the older cases, that the action will not lie for such
tacit nondisclosure. * *
"To this general rule, if such it be, the courts
have developed a number of exceptions, some of
which ar.e as yet very ill defined, and have no very
definite boundaries. The most obvious one is that if
the defendant does speak, he must disclose enough
to prevent his words from being misleading, * * *
"Another exception is found where the parties
stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation to one

*
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another, such as that of principal and agent, executor
and beneficiary of an estate, bank and investing depositor, or numerous others where special trust and
confidence is reposed. In addition, certain types of
contracts, such as those of suretyship or guaranty,
insurance, partnership and joint adventure, are recognized as creating something in the nature of a confidential relation, and hence as requiring the utmost
good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material
facts.

"* * *In a number of recent decisions, however,
the same duty of disclosure has been found in other
types of transactions where one party remains silent
as to a fact which he knows to be of importance to the
other. The law appears to be working toward the
ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material
facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct
demands it.
"When the plaintiff seeks relief of an equitabk
character, as by rescission of the transaction and
recovery of what he has parted with, a more liberal
rule usually is applied. * * * The greater liberality
found as to such remedies is probably due to the fact
that they are primarily concerned with preventing the
defendant from obtaining an unfair advantage of his
own, while the action of deceit requires him to go
further, and compensate the plaintiff for the loss he
has sustained."

Prosser quotes the case of BRASHER V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK (1936) 232 Ala 3480, 168 So. 42. Also,
the case of EDWARD BARRON ESTATE CO. vs. WOODRUFF CO. (1912) 163 Cal 561, 126 P 351, 42 LRA NS
125. This latter case cites the following relationships where
special trust and confidence reposed:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

"* * *

for instance, the relations of trustee and
cetui que trust, principal and agent, attorney and
client, physician and patient, priest and parishioner,
partners, tenants in common, husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, and many others
of like character."
The following excerpts from the Brasher case are pertinent:

"Where a relation of trust and confidence exists
between the parties it is the duty of the party in whom
the confidence is repos,ed to make full disclosure of
all material facts within his knowledge relating to
the transaction in question and any concealment of
material fact by him is a fraud." ( 232 Ala 340 at
page 344)
12 RCL 311. 45 AM REP 75, reads:
"Where confidential or fiduciary relations exist,
which afford the power and means to one party to a
transaction to take undue advantage of the other party
and there is found the slightest trace of undue influence or unfair advantage, redress will be given to the
injured party."
12 RCL p. 305, par. 66:
"Fraud may be committed by the suppression of
truth as well as by the suggestion of falsehood and it
is equally competent for the court to relieve against
it whether it is committed in one way or the other.
The one acts negatively, the other positively; both are
calculated, in different ways, to produce the same
results."
215 Ala 200, 110 So. 286:

"Courts of Justice will not look for naked technicalities and mere sentimentalism as to shield one who by
his fraud and deceit inflicts damage on another."
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(Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed. p. 566-671):

"D
. amages:
"Proof of damage is essential in an action of
deceit. The damages recoverable are limited to those
which might foreseeably be expected to follow from
the character of the misrepresentation. The better
view is that damage is not essential to restitution, in
equity or at law, but that it is merely one factor to be
considered in determining whether equitable relief
should be granted.
· "The .courts are divided as to two measures of
damages in a deceit action. The majority adopt the
"loss-of-bargain" rule, which gives the plaintiff the
difference between the value of what he has received
and the value he would have received if the representation had been true. The minority adopt the "out-ofpocket" rule, which gives him the difference between
the value received and the value he has parted with.
There is a tendency toward a flexible rule, adopting
either measure as the justice of the particular case
may requlre.

***

"Furthermore, the damage upon which a deceit
action rests must have been "proximately caused" by
the misrepresentation. So far as the fact of causation
is concerned, any loss which follows upon a transaction into which the misstatement induces the plaintiff
to enter may be said to be caused by it; * * *
"When restitution is sought, either in equity or
at law, a much more liberal policy has been adopted.
Since the purpose is not to compensate the plaintiff's
loss, but to restore what the defendant has received,
the courts look to the inequity of allowing him to
retain it, rather than to the damage which the plain. tiff has sustained. It is often repeated that damage

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
must be shown for rescission, and recovery has been
denied on that ,basis; but the assertion is so far honored in the br~each that it has little or no validity.(Prosser quotes Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
pars. 4 76 (c) and 4 77, which read as follows: (par.
476 (c): "No legal effect is caused by either fraudulent or other misrepresentation unless it induces affirmative or negative conduct, but it is not necessary
that misrepresentation should be the only inducement
for entering into a contract or for giving a discharge,
voidable. It is enough that the misrepres~entation is
relied on as an inducement. It is immaterial whether
damage is caused."
(par. 477): "Fraud or material misrepresentation
by a third person renders a transaction voidable
by a party induced thereby to enter into it if the other
party thereto has reason to know of the fraud or
misrepresentation before he has given or promised
in good faith something of value in the transaction
or changed his position materially by reason of the
transaction." See 48 Harv. L. Rev. 480.
(Prosser cont'd "Damages" p. 567):
"The plaintiff will not be permitted to rescind where
he has received substantially what he has bargained
for, or where subsequent events have made the representation good. But sufficient "damage" has been
found, or dispensed with, where the plaintiff has
received property of a different character or condition than he has promised, although· oJ equal value,
where the transaction proves to be less advantageous
than as represented, although there is no actual loss;
and where the false statement was important to the
plaintiff for reasons personal to himself, not affecting any financial value or profit. It seems corr,ect to
say rather that damage is not essential to rescission,
but that it is merely one factor to be considered in
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determining whether it is •equitable to allow the transaction to stand.
"Measure of Damages:
"The proximity of other forms of relief has been
reflected in the conflicting rules which have been
adopted as to the normal measure of damages in the
action of deceit. The American courts are divided
over two standards of measurement. One of these,
the so-called "out -of-pocket" rule, looks to the loss
which the plaintiff has suffered in the transaction,
and gives him the difference between the value of
what he as parted with and the value of what he has
received. If what he received was worth what he
paid for it, he has not been damaged, and there can
be no recovery. This rule is followed in deceit actions by the English courts, and by a minority of perhaps a dozen American jurisdictions. It is always
adopted as to a defense in the nature of recoupment,
and is of course the practical result reached by rescission where each party is restored to his original position. The other measurement, called the "loss-ofbargain" rule, gives the plaintiff the benefit of what
he was promised, and allows recovery of the difference between the actual value of what he has received
and the value that it would have had if it had been
as represented. This, of course, is the rule applied
in contract actions for breach of warranty, and it is
consistent with the result in cases of estoppel. It has
been adopted by some two-thirds of the courts which
have considered the question in actions of deceit.
There is the same conflict where the recovery is
based on negligent misrepresentation.
"As a matter of the strict logic of the form of
action, the first of these two rules is more consistent
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with the purpose of tort remedies, which is to compensate the plaintiff for a loss sustained, rather than
to give him the benefit of any contract bargain. Also,
it must of necessity be adopted where the defendant
is a third party who has made no contract with the
plaintiff, and it has been contended that the presence
of a contract should not change the damages where
the action is not on the contract itself. On the other
hand, it is urged in support of the majority rule that
the form of the action should be of little importance,
that in an action in the form of tort for breach of
warranty the plaintiff is given the benefit of his bargain and the addition of an allegation of intent to
deceive should certainly not decrease his recovery,
and that in many cases the out-of-pocket measure will
permit the fraudulent defendant to escape all liability
and have a chance to profit by the transaction if he
can get away with it.

"Few courts have followed either rule with entire consistency, and various proposals have been
made to introduce some flexibility into the measure
of damages. Thus it has been suggested that the lossof-bargain rule should be applied in cases of intentional misrepresentation, the out-of-pocket rule where
it is innocent; that the plaintiff be given the option
of either rule, or that the court should adopt the rule
which best fits the certainty of the damages proved,
and so avoid the possibility that a plaintiff who has
suffered a real damage may be denied recovery because he is unable to prove values. A leading Oregon
decision (Selman vs. Shirley, 1938, 161 Or. 582, 85
P 2d 384, 91 P 2d 312, 124 ALR I), which seems
to have given more careful consideration to the
problem than any other, and is beginning to be followed in other jurisdictions, reduces the matter to four
rules, as follows:
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"1. If the defrauded party is content with the
recovery of only the amount he has actually lost, his
damages will alw,ays be measured under that rule.

"2. If the fraudulent transaction also amounted
to a warranty, he may recover for loss of the bargain, because a fraud accompanied by a broken promise should cost the wrong-doer as much as the breach
of promise alone.
"3. Where the circumstances disclosed by the
proof are so vague as to cast virtually no light upon
the value of the property had it conformed to the
representations, damages will be awarded equal to the
loss sustained, and
"4. Where the daTTUlges uruier the benefit-ofbargain rule are proved with reasonable certainty,
that rule will be employed.
"* * *If the deception is found to have been
deliberate or wanton, punitive damages may be recovered, as in the case of other torts of similar character."
The treatment of deceit and fraud is exhaustively gone
into in Vols. 23 and 24, American Juris prudence, under
the title "What Constitutes Damage; Time of Accrual." This
authority cites on page 994, Vol. 23, par. 175, the following:
"Although proof of a material injury is essential
in an action of deceit, the loss or injury need not be
of a specifically pecuniary character. It is sufficienl
if the fraud has resulted in the loss of a right which
the law recognizes as of pecuniary value, *
The mere difficulty of estimation of injury, or that
the right is personal, does not bar recovery."
In support of this proposition American Jurisprudence
cites the case of KUJEK V. GOLDMAN, 150 NY 176, 44
NE 773:

**

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

"1. A man who induces another to marry a girl
by false representations that she is virtuous when in
fact she has been seduced by himself and has become
pregnant is liable for damages in an action by the
husband for fraud.

"2.

Exemplary damages are recoverable for fraud
in inducing a man to marry a woman who is pregnant
by another.

"3.

A direct precedent for the action is not necessary to give a right of action for the wrong.

"4.

Loss of the comfort founded upon affection
and respect derived from conjugal society is sufficient, irrespective of any pecuniary damages, to sustain an action by a husband against one who has
fraudulently induced him to marry a woman who
is pregnant by another."
The court said: "While no precendent is cited for
such an action, it does not follow that there is no remedy for the wrong, because every form of action when
brought for the first time must have been without a
precedent to support it. Courts sometimes of necessity abandon their search for precedents and yet sustain a recovery upon legal principles clearly applicable to the new state of facts, although there was no
direct precedent for it, because there had never been
an occasion to make one."
American Jurisprudence quotes the following principles which are pertinent to the issues in the instant case:
{Vol 23)

Par. 175, p. 994:
"One who is defrauded through false representations
respecting the solvency of another is damnified as
soon as he is induced to act in the manner occasioning the loss, and may maintain an action therefor at
once.''
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Par. 179, p. 998:
"Dispensability of Benefit to, or Interest of, Wrongdoer.-lt is well settled that in order to render one
liable for damages in an action of deceit, it is not
necessary that he shall have derived any benefit from
the deception or have colluded with the person who
was so benefited. Nor is it necessary, in order to
established remediable damage, that the person charged with fraud shall have had any interest in the
contemplated transaction, or in the subject matter
thereof, or in making the representation, or that he
shall have expected to reap any benefit from the
fraud. The fact that he happens to have such an interest is a matter of which the law takes no cognizance in such an action. It is not necessary to
allege or prove it; and proof of it does not affect
the rights of the parties, unless it goes far enough to
create a liability of another kind, although the fact
that he did derive a benefit may serve to strengthen
the plaintiff's case on the evidence."

Par. 187, p. 1011:
"Third Persons Not parties to Transaction.-A person may be charged with fraud, although he is not a
party to the transaction into which the complainant
is induced, by the misrepresentation, to enter. To
render one liable in an action of deceit, no privity of
contract between the plaintiff and defendant need be
shown, the character of repres;entee being sufficient."
See the following cases:
PICHE V. ROBBINS, 24 RI 325, 53 ATL 92, 28 LRA
(NS) 205. The Court in this case said:
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"If the vendor of property in selling same, asserts
that the property is unencumbered, which statement
is untrue, although he believes it to be true, he is
nevertheless liable to the vendee in an action for
deceit."
CARPENTER V. WRIGHT, 52 KAN 221,311 Pac 798:
"The fact that a person who makes a fraudulent
representation had no personal interest in the sale of
real estate, the title of which he misrepresented, and
that he received no portion of the purchase price, does
not relieve him from liability to the vendee where the
latter relied upon the representation."
HOTALING Vs. A. B. LEACH CO. (1928) 247 NY
84, 159 NE 870. The Court in this case held:
"The loss proximately caused by the defendants'
fraud is the difference between the price he paid and
the value of what he received when put to the use
contemplated by the parties."
In the case of HECHT V. METZLER (1897) 14 Utah
408, 48 P 37, 60 Am St Rep 906, the court stated:
"In an action for fraud and deceit in the sale or
exchange of property, the measure of damages is
the difference between the actual value of the property as it would have been if as represented and as it
actually was."
In summary, the undisputed facts as hereinabove set
forth, clearly disclose that the defendants entered into a
conspiracy with one Waldo Jackson, the operator of the
Jackson Sales & Service Co., to obtain $10,000 in cash
from plaintiffs to apply on the chattel mortgage indebtedness of Waldo Jackson and Jackson Sales & Service Co. to
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the defendant Springville Banking Co. The application of
the basic principles of law of fraud and deceit as hereinabove
set forth to the factual picture of this conspiracy clearly
justifies the court in reversing the decision of the lower court
in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs contend that the misconduct of defendants in failing to
disclose to plaintiffs the said mortgage lien against the stock
and equipment transferred to the Stockman & Farmers
Mart at its very inception, coupled with the defendants
maliciously false representations as to the financial stability
and capital structure of said corporation, as more particularly hereinabove set forth, not only caused plaintiffs to
suffer damages in the sum of $,10,000 but it was also the
basic cause of the insolvency of the Stockman & Farmers
Mart. It is well to keep in mind that under the law of
fraud and deceit it is only necessary for the plaintiffs
to show that the misconduct of the defendants was one of
the basic causes of plaintiffs' damage. It may be argued
there were other contributory causes, but the factual picture
now before the court does not disclose any other factors for
the insolvency of the Stockman & Farmers Mart and the
resultant damage to plaintiffs in the sum of $10,000. We
reiterate the rule laid down by William L. Prosser in his
Law of Torts as found on pages 18 and 19 of this brief:

"The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove
his case beyond a reasonable doubt. He need not negative entirely the possibility that the defendant's conduct was not a cause, and it is enough that he introduces evidence from which reasonable men may conclude that it is more probable that the event was
caused by the defendant than it was not. The fact
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of causation is incapable of mathematical proof,
since no man can say with absolute certainty what
would have occurred if the defendant had acted otherwise. Proof of what we call the relation of cause and
effect, that of necessary antecedent and inevitable
consequence, can be nothing more than the 'projection of our habit of expecting certain consequents to
follow certain antecedents merely because we had
observed these sequences on plievious occasions.' If
as a matter of ordinary experience a particular act
or omission might be expected, under the circumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result
in fact has followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the causal relation exists."
Certainly a person of ordinary experience would conclude that the misconduct of defendants resulted in the insolvency of the said corporation and the damage to plaintiffs in the sum of $10,000. In the first place, the proposed
corporation was to have an unencumbered inventory of stock
and equipment of the reasonable value of approximately
$26,500. As a matter of fact there was a chattel mortgage
outstanding against these assets in the sum of $45,000 with
an unpaid balance of $41,194.79. According to the misrepresentations of the defendants, these assets were free and
clear of encumbrances except the sum of $6,500, which sum
said corporation borrowed from the defendant bank to discharge obligations of creditors of Jackson Sales & Service
Co. Defendant Maycock testified this $6,500 was the total
obligations against these assets. This was a maliciously
false statement as there was an outstanding mortgage indebtedness of some $41,194.79. From these facts any ordinary person would say that the company was insolvent
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from its very inception. The Defendant Maycock also testi~
fied .that- the :$10;000 which plaintiffs were putting into the
business wits to ·pay for their stock in the corporation; that
this would give the 'corporation $10,000 in capital to operate
the company. Maycock testified: "We felt an additional

$10,000 in -the business wottld make it a better business and
it would: also -give a new· personality to it." ( R. 42) This
statement is also false. ·Under the conspiracy of the de~
fendants, the $10,000 was ·transferred immediately on the
date of its reception to the defendant bank. There was
also a statement made by Defendant Maycock that $10,000
was being 'put into .the business by Waldo Jackson. These
representations were all made when this corporation was
finally brought into being on March 2, 1955. This statement was false as shown by the sworn testimony of Waldo
Jackson in his deposition as hereinabove set forth. (R. 4748) So instead of having a capital of $20,000 this company had absolutely no capital at all, as the $6,500 which
they borrowed was solely for the purpose of discharging
obligations of the creditors of Jackson Sales & Service Co~
The· facts show that this amount was paid to these creditors.
From the beginning this corporation has $26,500 of stock
and equipment subject to a mortgage indebtedness of $41,·
194.79 and note of $6,500 owing to defendant Springville
Banking Co. Certainly no one would loan any money for
working capital on assets ·which were encumbered with liens
far in excess of their value. Is it any wonder that on or
about May of 1955 approximately two months after the
organization of this corporation the defendants put the
pressure on Waldo Jackson and plaintiffs to sell the inven·
tory and assets of the Stockman & Farmers Mart in order
that the $6,500 obligation to the bank could be liquidated.
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Finally on or about September of 1955 at the instance and
demand of defendants, Stockman & Farmers Mart did exchange its assets for a farm at Payson, Utah, owned by one
E. A. Smithurst, which farm was subject to a mortgage in
the approximate sum of .$6,751.23. The facts show that
defendant bank presided throughout this Smithurst transaction. Then to complete the financial capitulation of this
company, the defendants demanded that the farm be sold
to John T. Martin and after the mortgage was paid on the
farm, the net proceeds of $4,300 was paid to said defendant
bank upon said $6,500 loan. Applying Prosser's test of
causation, no sane person could possibly arrive at any conclusion other than that the misconduct of the defendants
was not only a basic cause of the insolvency of the Stockman
& Farmers Mart, but was the basic cause of said insolvency.
Certainly the misconduct of defendants was cleraly and definitely a basic cause and in the opinion of any reasonable person the basic cause of the damage suffered by plaintiffs in the
sum of $10,000. The cases of Hotaling vs. A. B. Leach Co.
and Hecht vs. Metzler, hereinabove quoted, lay down the
rule "that the loss proximately caused by defendant's fraud
is the difference between the price he paid and the value of
what he received when put to the use contemplated by the
parties." If the representations by defendants had been true
and the Stockman & Farmers Mart had enjoyed the capital
structure incident to these representations, the dire consequences that befell this corporation would never have
occurred and plaintiffs would not have suffered damages in
the sum of $10,000 or any other sum.
Furthermore, no sane person would have invested
$10,000 in such an enterprise if defendants had disclosed
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to plaintiffs that defendant hank had a $41,194.79 mortgage encumbrance against · the total inventory assets of

$26,500.
Respectfully submitted,

McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCULLOUGH
By: R. Verne McCullough
Partner
Attorneys for Appellants
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